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Robust monetary policy in a small open economy 
Bank of Finland Research 
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Kai Leitemo – Ulf Söderström 




This paper studies how a central bank’s preference for robustness against model 
misspecification affects the design of monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model 
of a small open economy. Due to the simple model structure, we are able to solve 
analytically solve the optimal robust policy rule, and separately analyze the effects 
of robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, 
output and the exchange rate. We show that an increased central bank preference 
for robustness makes monetary policy respond more aggressively or more 
cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of 
misspecification. 
 
Key words: Knightian uncertainty, model uncertainty, robust control, min-max 
policies 
 
JEL classification numbers: E52, E58, F41  
4 
Robusti rahapolitiikka pienessä avotaloudessa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 20/2005 
Kai Leitemo – Ulf Söderström 




Rahapolitiikan suunnittelussa yksi keskeisimmistä epävarmuuksista liittyy rele-
vantteihin kansantalouden toimintaa kuvaaviin malleihin. Tämäntyyppisen malli-
epävarmuuden vuoksi optimaalisten rahapoliittisten toimenpiteiden valinta vai-
keutuu. Yksittäisten rahapoliittisten toimenpiteiden kansantaloudelliset vaikutuk-
set näyttävät yhdessä mallissa järkeviltä, toisessa nurinkurisilta. Rahapolitiikan 
suunnittelussa tulisi tällöin suosia robusteja eli virhesietoisia toimenpiteitä, joilla 
on toivotut kansantaloudelliset vaikutukset useassa toisistaan hieman poikkeavas-
sa mallissa. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten keskuspankin halu varautua 
osittain virheellisten mallien mahdollisuuteen vaikuttaa rahapolitiikan suunnitte-
luun modernissa dynaamisessa pienen avotalouden makromallissa. Mallin yksin-
kertaisen rakenteen vuoksi optimaalinen robusti rahapolitiikan ohjaussääntö voi-
daan ratkaista siinä analyyttisesti. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan erikseen inflaation, 
tuotannon ja valuuttakurssien mallivirheisiin varautumisen vaikutuksia. Tulosten 
mukaan keskuspankin halu vahvistaa rahapolitiikan virhesietoisuutta ei aina saa 
sitä reagoimaan aggressiivisemmin talouteen kohdistuviin häiriöihin. Rahapolitii-
kan vaste riippuu tällöin häiriöiden ja mallivirheen alkuperästä. 
 
Avainsanat: knightilainen epävarmuus, malliepävarmuus, robusti kontrolli, min-
max-politiikat 
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Good policy design requires a good understanding of private sector behavior.
Such an understanding is important not only in order to identify market
deﬁciencies and hence policy objectives, but also when trying to meet
objectives in the best possible way. Recently, the New-Keynesian model as
laid out by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997),
Clarida et al (1999) and others has established itself as the mainstream model
for monetary policy analysis. This model captures the sluggish adjustment of
prices and the intertemporal consumption decision in a model framework with
optimizing households and ﬁrms. With only a limited number of equations,
the model is having a strong inﬂuence and has provided policymakers with
several guiding policy principles in responding to the diﬀerent disturbances in
the economy (see, eg, Clarida et al, 1999, and King, 2000). More recently, the
New-Keynesian framework has been extended to open economies (see, eg, Galí
and Monacelli, 2004, or Clarida et al, 2002).
Although the New-Keynesian model has many attractive theoretical
properties, it has been criticized by many researchers, most notably for not
ﬁtting the data well.1 One response to such criticism is to design more
complex models that are better able to capture the behavior of macroeconomic
variables, following, eg, Christiano et al (2005). Such models gain in realism
but lose in tractability. An alternative route is to acknowledge that the simple
model is a potentially misspeciﬁed description of reality, and to design policy to
take this possibility of misspeciﬁcation into account. In this paper we follow the
second route and allow for the possibility that the model may not be the correct
representation of private sector behavior. Rather, we will assume that the true
model of private sector behavior lies in some neighborhood around the reference
model, and we analyze how monetary policy should be designed in order to
work reasonably well for all models inside this neighborhood. This problem has
recently been addressed by Hansen and Sargent (2004) using ‘robust control’
techniques. Assuming that the policymaker is unable to formulate a probability
distribution over plausible models, the robust policymaker designs policy for
the worst possible outcome within a pre-speciﬁed set of models.2
We apply robust control techniques developed by Hansen and Sargent
(2004) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004) to a simple New Keynesian
open-economy model developed by Galí and Monacelli (2004) and Clarida et
al (2002). The simple model structure allows us to ﬁnd closed-form solutions
for the optimal robust policy and the equilibrium behavior of the economy.
We also generalize the standard robust control framework by allowing the
policymaker’s preference for robustness to diﬀer across equations, reﬂecting
the conﬁdence the policymaker has in each relationship. For instance, the
policymaker may be quite conﬁdent about one of the equations (eg, the Phillips
1See, eg, Ball (1994), Mankiw (2001), or Estrella and Fuhrer (2002).
2Note that the robust policy is designed for one of the least likely outcomes of the model,
but only within a prespeciﬁed set of models. In typical applications, this set of models is
chosen so that the policymaker cannot statistically reject any of the models inside the set.
In our analysis, we focus on marginal amounts of robustness, so monetary policy is robust
against very small degrees of misspeciﬁcation.
7curve) and believe that robustness to deviations from this equation is not
important, but at the same time be very uncertain about some other equation
(eg, the exchange rate relationship). This approach allows us to consider each
equation in turn and ask what is the appropriate response of robust policy
to misspeciﬁcation in this particular equation. Thus we will consider several
diﬀerent types of misspeciﬁcation within the model: misspeciﬁcation in ﬁrms’
price-setting, misspeciﬁcation in consumer behavior, and misspeciﬁcation in
the model determining the exchange rate.3
The ability to focus on speciﬁcation errors in particular equations seems
important. Policymakers are more conﬁdent in some relationships than in
others, and so regard some types of speciﬁcation errors to be more important
than others. In open economies, monetary policymakers are particularly
uncertain about the eﬀects of the exchange rate on the economy and the eﬀects
of monetary policy on the exchange rate. Using our approach, we are able to
analyze the proper response of monetary policy to such speciﬁcation errors,
while keeping other sources of misspeciﬁcation ﬁxed.
One important part of the analysis will focus on the eﬀects of model
misspeciﬁcation and the central bank’s preference for robustness on monetary
policy. Thus far, there is no consensus about whether increased uncertainty
should lead to more aggressive or more cautious policy behavior. Following
the seminal analysis of Brainard (1967), it is well-accepted that increased
uncertainty about the eﬀects of policy should lead to more cautious policy
behavior, at least within a Bayesian framework. However, Craine (1979) and
Söderström (2002) show that this result does not generalize to all parameters
in the model: increased uncertainty about the persistence of inﬂation should
instead make policy more aggressive.
Within the robust control literature, increased uncertainty tends to lead to
more aggressive policy behavior (see, eg, Hansen and Sargent, 2001, 2004,
Giannoni, 2002, and Giordani and Söderström, 2004), but these studies
typically use numerical methods to solve for the optimal robust policy in a
closed economy. In a companion paper, Leitemo and Söderström (2004), we
use our analytical approach to show that the aggressiveness result seems to be
an inherent feature of robust policy in a closed economy. In the present paper,
however, we will show that this result does not carry over to the open economy:
depending on the source of misspeciﬁcation and the type of disturbance hitting
the economy, optimal robust policy in an open economy can be either more
aggressive or more cautious than the non-robust policy.
A second set of results concern the eﬀects on the macroeconomy of
the central bank’s fear of model misspeciﬁcation. As the central bank
designs policy to do well in the worst-case scenario, this will have important
consequences for the economy in other more likely outcomes. We show that the
price of being robust to misspeciﬁcation in the Phillips curve or the exchange
rate equations comes in the form of ineﬃciently high output variability, whereas
3Leitemo and Söderström (2005) study the eﬀects of exchange rate model misspeciﬁcation
on the performance of optimized simple monetary policy rules. In their framework, the
central bank is uncertain about the exchange rate model, but private agents have perfect
information about the exact speciﬁcation of the model. In the present paper both the central
bank and private agents have doubts about the true model.
8robustness against misspeciﬁcation in the output equation comes at the cost
of higher inﬂation variability.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the New
Keynesian open-economy model and review some terminology. In Section 3
we derive the stochastic equilibrium under a robust policymaker, both in the
‘worst-case’ model when misspeciﬁcation is present and in the ‘approximating’
model, which is the most likely outcome. Section 4 is devoted to analyzing
the eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness, while Section 5 presents
a numerical example. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 A simple New-Keynesian open-economy model
We use a very simple model of a small open economy developed by Galí and
Monacelli (2004) and Clarida et al (2002), but deviate from these authors by
introducing a time-varying premium on foreign bond holdings. This enables
us to analyze misspeciﬁcation concerning the model determining the exchange
rate, which is an important goal of the paper. The model is a generalization
of the canonical New-Keynesian model for a closed economy developed by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997) and others,
and carefully examined by Clarida et al (1999).
The world is assumed to consist of two countries: a small open home
country and a large, approximately closed, foreign country. The two countries
share preferences and technology and produce traded consumption goods. In
the home country, ﬁrms produce domestic goods using labor as the only input,
and households consume domestic and imported goods.
Deﬁne by πt the rate of inﬂation in the domestic goods sector; by xt the
output gap in the domestic economy, ie, the log deviation of domestic output
from its ﬂexible-price level; and by et the real exchange rate, deﬁned in terms
of the domestic price level as
et = st + p
f
t − pt, (2.1)
where st is the nominal exchange rate, p
f
t is the price level in the foreign
economy, and pt is the price level of domestically produced goods.4
4Formally, et deﬁned as in equation (2.1) is the terms of trade, the diﬀerence between
the price on imported goods (the foreign price level denominated in domestic currency) and
domestic goods. A more traditional way of deﬁning the real ex c h a n g er a t ew o u l db ei nt e r m s
of the domestic consumer price index:





t =( 1 − ω)pt + ω(p
f
t + st),a n dw h e r eω is the share of imports in domestic
consumption. However, since the equation determining et is derived from the uncovered
interest rate parity condition determining the nominal exchange rate, we will nevertheless
refer to it as the real exchange rate. Our deﬁnition is not crucial to our results: the traditional
real exchange rate qt is related to our real exchange rate et by
qt =( 1− ω)et,
so changes in et are proportionally reﬂected in changes in qt.
9The domestic inﬂation rate, the output gap and the real exchange rate are
interrelated according to the following three equations
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + αet +Σ πε
π
t , (2.2)
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
[it − Etπt+1] − γ [Etet+1 − et]+Σ xε
x
t, (2.3)
et = Etet+1 − [it − Etπt+1]+Σ eε
e
t. (2.4)
Equation (2.2) is a New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the open economy, where
the rate of domestic inﬂation depends on expected future inﬂation and current
marginal cost, which is aﬀected by the output gap and the exchange rate.
The real exchange rate aﬀects marginal cost through households’ labor supply
decision: households value their wage relative to the consumer price index
(which includes prices of imported goods), so the equilibrium wage depends
on the real exchange rate. The inﬂation shock, επ
t , is due to productivity
disturbances which aﬀect the ﬂexible-price level of the real exchange rate.
Equation (2.3) is an expectational IS curve, expressed in terms of the
output gap, that relates the output gap to the expected future output gap,
the real interest rate (as households substitute consumption over time), and
the real exchange rate (as consumption is partly satisﬁed through imported
goods). The demand shock εx
t reﬂects productivity disturbances which aﬀect
the ﬂexible-price level of output, or, equivalently, changes in the natural real
interest rate.
Finally, equation (2.4) is a real interest parity condition, where the expected
rate of real depreciation is related to the real interest rate diﬀerential (also in
terms of domestic inﬂation) between the domestic and foreign economies. All
foreign variables are assumed to be exogenous, and therefore set to zero. The
exchange rate disturbance, εe
t, reﬂects the fact that domestic households pay
a premium on foreign bond holdings.
All shocks ε
j
t are assumed to be white noise with zero mean and unit
variance. This allows us to ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the robust control
problem.
Appendix A shows how to derive this model from the optimizing behavior
of a representative agent in a small open economy, giving a structural
interpretation to all parameters in the model, following Galí and Monacelli
(2004), Clarida et al (2002) and Walsh (2003, Ch. 6.5).5 The parameter β is
the discount factor of domestic households and ﬁrms, while the parameters κ,
ασ ,a n dγ depend on ‘deep’ parameters according to
5Galí and Monacelli (2004) and Clarida et al (2002) eliminate the exchange rate from
the model using the UIP condition (2.4) with εe
t =0 , thus reaching a formulation of the
open-economy model that is isomorphic to the closed-economy model. We are particularly
interested in model misspeciﬁcation concerning the UIP condition, and therefore include the
time-varying premium εe
t. As a consequence, we cannot eliminate the exchange rate from
the system.
10κ ≡















where θ is the probability that a ﬁrm is not able to change its price in a
given period in the sticky-price model of Calvo (1983); ˆ σ is the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution; η is the elasticity of the representative household’s
labor supply; ω is the share of imports in domestic consumption, ie, the degree
of openness; and δ is the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign
goods. Clearly, the parameters κ,α,σ and β are always positive, and also γ
will be positive for typical parameterizations, as (2−ω)ω>(1−ω)ω and δ is
typically not much smaller than ˆ σ
−1.
3 Robust monetary policy
3.1 Introducing model misspeciﬁcation
We close the model by assuming that the short-term interest rate it is set by a
central bank to minimize a standard objective function which is quadratic in















where λ is the central bank’s weight on output stabilization relative to inﬂation
stabilization.6 However, the central bank worries about model misspeciﬁcation:
while the model (2.2)—(2.4) is seen as the most likely model, the central bank
acknowledges that this benchmark model may be misspeciﬁed. Therefore, the
central bank wants to design policy to be robust against reasonable deviations
from the benchmark model. To formalize these fears of model misspeciﬁcation,
we follow Hansen and Sargent (2004) and introduce in each equation a second
type of disturbance, denoted v
j
t, which is controlled by a ﬁctitious ‘evil agent’,
6This objective function is often used to characterize monetary policy with an inﬂation
target, a strategy that is very common in small open economies (see, eg, Svensson, 2000).
As shown by Galí and Monacelli (2004), when ˆ σ = η =1this objective function represents
a second-order approximation of the utility loss for the representative consumer resulting
from deviations from the optimal strict inﬂation-targeting policy (in the model without a
foreign exchange premium). Note also that although the central bank is aware that the
model may be misspeciﬁed, it does not take into account that model misspeciﬁcation may
aﬀect its objectives, but takes the objective function (3.1) as given.
11who represents the central bank’s worst fears concerning misspeciﬁcation.
Thus, the misspeciﬁed model is given by





xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ










The speciﬁcation errors v
j
t will be allowed to feed back from the state variables,
so although the errors enter the model as additive shocks, they may well
disturb the model in the same way as multiplicative parameter uncertainty
(see Hansen and Sargent, 2004).7 The central bank then designs policy for the
worst possible outcome of the model, where the evil agent chooses the amount
of misspeciﬁcation v
j
t optimally, given some constraints (to be speciﬁed below).
This model will be referred to as the worst-case model, and is the outcome that
the central bank fears the most, against which it wants policy to be robust. The
most likely outcome of the model, on the other hand, is one where the central
bank sets policy and agents form expectations to reﬂect misspeciﬁcation in the
worst-case model, but there is no such misspeciﬁcation in practice (so all v
j
t
are zero). We will refer to this model as the approximating model.
The amount of misspeciﬁcation, measured by v
j
t, is scaled by the parameter
Σj, which determines the volatility of the shock in equation j. Intuitively, the
speciﬁcation error is disguised by the disturbance term ε
j
t, so if the disturbance
has no variance, the speciﬁcation error would be detected immediately. The
larger is the variance of the disturbance, the larger can the speciﬁcation error
be without being detected.
3.2 Setting up the control problem
To design the robust policy, the central bank takes into account a certain
degree of model misspeciﬁcation by minimizing its objective function in the
worst possible model within a given set of plausible models. Depending on its
preference for robustness, the central bank allocates a budget ηj to the evil
agent, which is used to create misspeciﬁcation in equation j. In contrast to
Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind, we will distinguish
between diﬀerent sources of model misspeciﬁcation, by allowing the evil agent
to have diﬀerent budget constraints for the diﬀerent controls. Thus the budget
constraints are
7Onatski and Williams (2003) point out that the Hansen-Sargent approach to robustness
does not capture all types of parameter uncertainty, and that the ‘robust’ rules may be fragile
























2 ≤ ηe. (3.7)
In a standard non-robust control problem we would have ηj =0for all j,
while the standard robust control problem would have a common constraint




t )2 +( vx
t )2 +( ve
t)2] ≤ η.
Here, in addition to analyzing the general eﬀects of misspeciﬁcation, letting
all ηj be positive, we can also analyze speciﬁcation errors in one equation at a
time by setting one ηj > 0 and the other two to zero.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2004) the robust monetary policy is



















subject to the misspeciﬁed model (3.2)—(3.4) and the evil agent’s budget
constraints (3.5)—(3.7). The central bank thus sets the interest rate to minimize
the value of its intertemporal loss function, while the evil agent sets its controls
to maximize the central bank’s loss, given the constraints on misspeciﬁcation.




























t[xt − Etxt+1 + σ
−1(it − Etπt+1) (3.9)














t variables are Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (3.2)—(3.4)
and the θj parameters determine the set of models available to the evil agent
against which the policymaker wants to be robust. These parameters are
related to the evil agent’s budget ηj:a s ηj approaches zero, θj approaches
inﬁnity, and the degree of misspeciﬁcation approaches zero.
Throughout, we will focus on marginal amounts of model misspeciﬁcation.
For suﬃciently large amounts of misspeciﬁcation, the evil agent will be able to
overturn any relationship in the model, so the approximating model (2.2)—(2.4)
is not a good description of reality. We therefore want to consider reasonable
degrees of model misspeciﬁcation that cannot be easily identiﬁed by the
policymaker.8 More speciﬁcally, we will analyze the eﬀects of small increases
8In numerical approaches to robust control, the amount of misspeciﬁcation can be chosen
such that the policymaker cannot distinguish between the approximating model and the
worst-case model at reasonable statistical signiﬁcance levels. See Hansen and Sargent (2004)
and Giordani and Söderlind (2004).
13in the preference for robustness starting from the non-robust policy, ie, small
decreases in each θj starting from θj = ∞.
3.3 Optimality conditions
We assume that neither the central bank nor the evil agent has access to any
commitment mechanism. Consequently, we take expectations as given in the
optimization and look for a discretionary equilibrium. From the ﬁrst-order
conditions we can derive the following optimality conditions relating inﬂation,























































This immediately gives us our ﬁrst set of results.
Proposition 3.1 (Optimal output—inﬂation trade-oﬀ)
The optimal output—inﬂation trade-oﬀ is not aﬀected by the central bank’s
preference for robustness.
Proof. See equations (3.15)—(3.17): given θj,e a c hvj is increasing in Σj.
14Thus, the presence of model misspeciﬁcation will not alter the central bank’s
optimal ‘targeting rule’ in equation (3.10). However, as there is some
misspeciﬁcation in each equation, the optimal (reduced form) interest rate
rule for the central bank will be aﬀected by model misspeciﬁcation.9
Proposition 3.2 (Misspeciﬁcation and shocks)
Given the preference for robustness, the degree of misspeciﬁcation in an
equation depends positively on the variance of the shock associated with the
equation.
Proof. See equations (3.15)—(3.17): given θj,each vj is increasing in Σj.
Intuitively, the larger is the variance of a given shock, the more diﬃcult it is
for the central bank to identify misspeciﬁcation in that particular equation.
Therefore the central bank wants to guard against such speciﬁcation errors.
Proposition 3.3 (Misspeciﬁcation and inﬂation)
The degree of misspeciﬁcation in all equations is larger when inﬂation is further
away from steady state.
Proof. See equations (3.15)—(3.17): all vj increase (in absolute value) in
πt.
The central bank fears all shocks that have inﬂationary eﬀects as these force
the central bank to reduce the output gap further to achieve the desired
trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the output gap. The evil agent adds to such
shocks through misspeciﬁcation in all equations. In the worst-case model,
misspeciﬁcation in the Phillips curve will increase inﬂation further when
inﬂation is already high. Misspeciﬁcation in the output equation forces output
down when inﬂation is high, increasing the cost of counteracting an already
high inﬂation rate. The ﬁnal misspeciﬁcation, in the exchange rate equation,
induces an exchange rate depreciation when inﬂation is high, leading to higher
inﬂation and larger costs of achieving the desired trade-oﬀ between inﬂation
and output.
From equations (3.15)—(3.17) we see that the Phillips curve is subject to
misspeciﬁcation in most parameterizations of the model. As long as Σπ > 0 and
the budget is non-zero (θπ < ∞), the evil agent will allocate misspeciﬁcation
to this equation. Indeed, as discussed in detail in Leitemo and Söderström
(2004), in the closed-economy version of the model (when α = γ =0 ), the
central bank will only fear misspeciﬁcation in the inﬂation equation: in the
9Walsh (2004) obtains a similar result, showing that the ‘implicit instrument rule’ (similar
to the targeting rule) is not aﬀected by central bank robustness against misspeciﬁcation in
a New-Keynesian model of a closed economy. However, in our model this result is to a large
extent due to the timing in the game between the central bank and the evil agent. Here
we assume that the central bank and the evil agent each acts optimally given the other
player’s actions, leading to a Nash equilibrium. If we instead assume that the central bank
acts as a Stackelberg leader and takes into account the misspeciﬁcation of the evil agent
when setting the interest rate, the optimal targeting rule will depend on the preference for
robustness. Leitemo and Söderström (2004) analyze the eﬀects of robustness under diﬀerent
timing assumptions in a closed-economy version of the model.
15closed economy, the policymaker is able to counteract any speciﬁcation errors
in the output equation by an appropriate adjustment of the interest rate. As
interest rate movements do not inﬂuence central bank loss independently, the
central bank does not fear such speciﬁcation errors. In the open economy,
however, the central bank cannot directly oﬀset output shocks by changing
the interest rate, as this would aﬀect the exchange rate and therefore inﬂation
(see Walsh, 1999). Thus, the existence of an exchange rate channel makes the
output equation more prone to misspeciﬁcation, and the policymaker will fear
that output is low when inﬂation is high. This would make the central bank
lower the interest rate, leading to an exchange rate depreciation that increases
inﬂation even further.
The stronger is the eﬀect of the interest rate on output (the smaller is σ), the
more prone is the exchange rate equation to misspeciﬁcation. When inﬂation
is positive, the central bank fears that a real exchange rate depreciation
will further increase inﬂation. In order to curb the eﬀects on inﬂation, the
interest rate would need to be increased, which would reduce output. This is
particularly costly for the policymaker if the interest rate has a strong eﬀect
on output.
These eﬀects of robustness against output and exchange rate
misspeciﬁcation are stronger when the exchange rate has a strong eﬀect on
inﬂation (so α is large). The central bank therefore fears such speciﬁcation
errors more when α is large. On the other hand, if the exchange rate has
a suﬃciently strong impact on output (so γ is large), the central bank will
worry less about misspeciﬁcation of the output or exchange rate equations.
The reason is that the exchange rate depreciation (caused by higher inﬂation)
w o u l do ﬀ s e ts o m eo ft h en e g a t i v ei m p a c to fh i g h e ri n t e r e s tr a t e so no u t p u t .
As γ approaches inﬁnity, only misspeciﬁcation in the inﬂation equation has
consequences for central bank loss.
3.4 Solving the model




t, and all expectations are zero. This allows us to ﬁnd
a closed-form solution for the robust control problem. We will thus look for
a solution for the endogenous variables πt,x t,e t, the central bank’s control
it, and the evil agent’s controls vπ
t ,vx
t ,v e
t in terms of the three shocks. The







































ˆ aπ ˆ ax ˆ ae
ˆ bπ ˆ bx ˆ be






















Finally, the approximating model, where policy is conducted according
to (3.20), but there is no misspeciﬁcation (so all v
j











¯ aπ ¯ ax ¯ ae
¯ bπ ¯ bx ¯ be













To ﬁnd these solutions, we begin by looking for the worst-case solution for
πt,x t,e t in (3.18) and the worst possible degree of misspeciﬁcation in (3.19).
Noting that equations (3.10) and (3.15)—(3.17) imply that













we need only to solve for the coeﬃcients aj,c j,d j. Second, we will ﬁnd
the optimal policy rule (3.20). Third, we will ﬁnd the solution for the
approximating model (3.21) by using the optimal policy rule in the original
model given by (2.2)—(2.4).
Note that we allow the evil agent only to respond to the same variables as
the policymaker. This diﬀers from the setup of Hansen and Sargent (2004) and
Giordani and Söderlind (2004), where the evil agent is allowed to respond also
to lagged state variables, thus introducing persistence in the shocks.10 In our
setup, the evil agent is not allowed to introduce serial correlation in the shocks,
as there is no such persistence from the outset. This assumption is mainly for
tractability, but is also consistent with the assumption in both approaches that
the evil agent is not allowed to introduce additional state variables to increase
the degree of serial correlation in the endogenous variables.
3.4.1 The worst-case model
First, to ﬁnd an expression for the interest rate, we solve the output
equation (3.3) for the interest rate it and substitute for xt and vx
t using
10This is because Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004) write
the model on its state-space form where the shocks are predetermined variables and are
written as autoregressive processes without any persistence. The set of state variables then
includes also lagged values of the shocks, and the evil agent is allowed to respond to all state
variables.
17the optimal trade-oﬀ in (3.10) and the worst possible output misspeciﬁcation
in (3.16). This yields









where we evaluate the sign of all coeﬃcients when the preference for robustness
is small, so θj is close to inﬁnity. Although equation (3.26) describes central
bank behavior, it is not a true reaction function due to the presence of
non-predetermined variables (πt, et and their expectations) on the right-hand
side. Instead, it is an optimal implicit instrument rule, using the terminology
of Giannoni and Woodford (2003), although obtained under discretion rather
than under commitment from a timeless perspective. In the closed-economy
case, this rule is independent of the preference for robustness, as in Walsh (200):
when α =0 ,n oθj enters equation (3.26). However, in the open economy this
is no longer true, as the central bank also fears misspeciﬁcation in the output
equation.
To derive the true policy reaction function in (3.20) we must ﬁrst solve for
the forward-looking variables πt and et as functions of the underlying shocks.
Using the policy trade-oﬀ from (3.10) and the evil agent’s control vπ
t from (3.15)
in the Phillips curve (3.2), we obtain







and collecting terms we get









Likewise, using the interest rate from (3.26) and the expression for ve
t
from (3.17) in the UIP condition (3.4) yields











Note that B is decreasing in the central bank’s preference for robustness against
output misspeciﬁcation (increasing in θx), C is decreasing in the preference
for inﬂation robustness, and D is decreasing in the preference for robustness
against both output and exchange rate misspeciﬁcation.









































E ≡ (1 + σγ)C + αD > 0, (3.41)
which is decreasing in the preference for robustness against all three types of
speciﬁcation errors.
Thus, for small degrees of robustness, inﬂation in the worst-case model is
positively related to the inﬂation and exchange rate disturbances (aπ,a e > 0),
but negatively related to the output disturbance (ax < 0). For the output
gap, the coeﬃcients are of the opposite sign (see equation (3.10)), so output
is negatively related to the inﬂation and exchange rate disturbances, but
positively related to the output disturbance. The exchange rate is positively
related to the exchange rate disturbance (ce > 0), but negatively related to
the inﬂation and output disturbances (cπ,c x < 0).
Equations (3.15)—(3.17) then imply that the central bank’s worst possible









































19Misspeciﬁcation in the inﬂation and exchange rate equations is positively
related to inﬂation and exchange rate disturbances (ˆ aπ,ˆ ae,ˆ cπ,ˆ ce > 0), but
negatively related to the output disturbance (ˆ ax,ˆ cx < 0), while misspeciﬁcation
in the output equation is negatively related to inﬂation and exchange rate
disturbances (ˆ bπ,ˆ be < 0), but positively related to the output disturbance
(ˆ bx > 0).
3.4.2 The policy rule
Using the solution for inﬂation and the exchange rate in the interest rate
equation (3.26), the reduced-form solution for the interest rate is











dπ = σ[Baπ + γcπ] > 0, (3.49)
dx = σ[Bax + γcx +Σ x] > 0, (3.50)
de = σ[Bae + γce] > 0. (3.51)
Thus, for small amounts of misspeciﬁcation, monetary policy responds
positively to each disturbance: positive realizations of the inﬂation, output
or exchange rate disturbances all make the central bank raise the interest rate.
(Again, see Appendix B for details.)
The result that monetary policy is tightened after positive inﬂation or
output disturbances is well-known from the closed-economy version of the
model, see, eg, Clarida et al (1999). Here in the open-economy model, policy
is tightened also after a positive exchange rate disturbance: An exchange rate
depreciation tends to increase domestic inﬂation, so by tightening policy, the
central bank induces an immediate appreciation and an expected depreciation
of the exchange rate, which reduces both inﬂation and output.
3.4.3 The approximating model
The solution for the worst-case model derived so far is the reduced form under
the worst possible case of misspeciﬁcation, so the evil agent uses its controls as
eﬃciently as possible, and the policy rule and private agents’ expectations
reﬂect this misspeciﬁcation. However, this is also a very unlikely model.
In contrast, the most likely model, or using Hansen and Sargent’s (2004)
terminology, the ‘approximating model’, is when the policy rule and agents’
expectations reﬂect the central bank’s preference for robustness, but the actual
misspeciﬁcation is zero.
As in the worst-case model, expectations are zero. Thus we ﬁnd the
approximating model by using the optimal robust interest rate rule from
20equation (3.48) in the original model (2.2)—(2.4).11 This yields




−1it + γet +Σ xε
x
t, (3.53)
et = −it +Σ eε
e
t, (3.54)























¯ aπ =Σ π −
 
α + κ(γ + σ
−1)
 
dπ > 0, (3.58)
¯ ax = κΣx −
 
α + κ(γ + σ
−1)
 
dx < 0, (3.59)
¯ ae =( α + κγ)Σe −
 
α + κ(γ + σ
−1)
 
de > 0, (3.60)
¯ bπ = −(γ + σ
−1)dπ < 0, (3.61)
¯ bx =Σ x − (γ + σ
−1)dx > 0, (3.62)
¯ be = γΣe − (γ + σ
−1)de < 0, (3.63)
¯ cπ = −dπ < 0, (3.64)
¯ cx = −dx < 0, (3.65)
¯ ce =Σ e − de > 0. (3.66)
Again see Appendix B for details.
In this most likely outcome of the model, a positive realization of the
inﬂation shock makes the central bank tighten policy to counteract the
inﬂationary impulse (dπ > 0). This reduces the output gap (¯ bπ < 0)a n dm a k e s
the real exchange rate appreciate (¯ cπ < 0) while the net eﬀect on inﬂation is
positive (¯ aπ > 0). After a positive output shock, the central bank also tightens
policy (dx > 0), leading to a real appreciation. In a closed economy, the central
bank could oﬀset all eﬀects of the output shock on output and inﬂation, but
in an open economy the real exchange rate appreciation reduces inﬂation, so
the central bank will not oﬀset the shock completely (see Walsh, 1999). Thus,
output is positively related to the output shock (¯ bx > 0), while inﬂation and
the exchange rate are negatively related to the output shock (¯ ax,¯ cx < 0).
Finally, a positive exchange rate shock tends to increase inﬂation, so again the
central bank tightens policy to oﬀset these eﬀects (de > 0). This reduces the
output gap (¯ be < 0), but the net eﬀects on inﬂation and the exchange rate are
still positive (¯ ae,¯ ce > 0).
As we focus on small preferences for robustness (so all θj are close to
inﬁnity), the qualitative results are the same in the worst-case and the
approximating models, as well as in the non-robust version of the model.
However, the eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness may well diﬀer
11As policy is implemented using the instrument rule (3.48), which is optimal only for the
misspeciﬁed model, we can no longer use the optimal output—inﬂation trade-oﬀ (3.10) to
determine the output gap.
21between the worst-case and approximating models, also when θj is very large.
We now turn to analyzing how such an increase in robustness aﬀects the
behavior of policy and the economy.
4 The eﬀects of robustness
The main focus of our analysis concerns the eﬀects of the central bank’s fears of
model misspeciﬁcation on optimal monetary policy and the resulting behavior
of the economy. We will thus analyze the eﬀects on the model solution of
an increase in the preference for robustness, ie, a decrease in each θj.F o r





,j = π,x,e, (4.1)
ie, the marginal eﬀects on the absolute value of the coeﬃcient aπ of a decrease
in each θj.
First, we will see whether inﬂation, output and the exchange rate in
the worst-case model are more or less sensitive to shocks under model
misspeciﬁcation. Second, we will analyze the consequences for the optimal
policy behavior, and see whether monetary policy is more or less aggressive
under model misspeciﬁcation. Finally, we will demonstrate how an increased
preference for robustness aﬀects the macroeconomy in the approximating
model. Some short proofs are presented here, while more extensive proofs
are relegated to Appendix C.
4.1 The worst-case model of inﬂation and output
We begin by analyzing the eﬀects of increased model misspeciﬁcation (ie, an
increased preference for robustness) on the worst-case model of inﬂation and
output.
Proposition 4.1 (Worst-case inﬂation and output)
In the worst-case model, an increased preference for robustness against
misspeciﬁcation in any equation increases the response of inﬂation and output
to all shocks.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Intuitively, with an increased preference for robustness, the central bank fears
that inﬂation and output are more sensitive to shocks, and therefore more
volatile. As we do not allow for shock persistence, the central bank fears only
that shocks have a larger impact on inﬂation and output, not that they are
more persistent (as in Giordani and Söderlind, 2004).
224.2 The exchange rate and monetary policy
The eﬀects of model misspeciﬁcation on the exchange rate in the worst-case
model are intimately related to the eﬀects on monetary policy. We therefore
discuss these in parallel.
First, as misspeciﬁcation in the Phillips curve increases, the central bank
will fear that inﬂation is more responsive to shocks. Therefore, after a positive
shock to inﬂation, the central bank will tighten policy more, leading to a
larger exchange rate appreciation in the worst-case model. After a positive
exchange rate shock, the central bank again fears that the eﬀects on inﬂation
will be larger, and tightens policy more, leading to a smaller depreciation of the
exchange rate. After a positive demand shock, the central bank fears that its
policy response will lead to a larger fall in inﬂation. Therefore, the central bank
tightens policy less than if there were no inﬂation misspeciﬁcation, leading to
a smaller exchange rate appreciation in the worst-case model.
If the central bank is more uncertain about the determination of output, it
fears that shocks have a larger eﬀect on the output gap. A positive inﬂation
shock then leads it to tighten policy less, implying a smaller exchange rate
appreciation. After a positive output shock the central bank fears that output
will increase further, so the interest rate is increased more, and the exchange
rate depreciates by more than when there is no output misspeciﬁcation. A
positive exchange rate shock leads the central bank to tighten policy to reduce
the output gap and inﬂation and oﬀset the exchange rate depreciation. If
output is more uncertain, however, the central bank will tighten policy less,
leading to a larger depreciation in the worst-case model.
Finally, if the central bank worries about misspeciﬁcation in the exchange
rate equation, it fears that the exchange rate is very sensitive to shocks.
Therefore, after a positive inﬂation or exchange rate shock, it will tighten
policy more. In the worst-case model, this leads to a smaller exchange
rate appreciation after an inﬂation shock and a larger depreciation after an
exchange rate shock. After a positive output shock, on the other hand, the
central bank will not tighten policy as much to avoid large eﬀects on the
exchange rate. In the worst-case model, the net eﬀect is a larger exchange rate
appreciation.
These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4.2 (Worst-case exchange rate under inﬂation
misspeciﬁcation)
In the worst-case model, a larger preference for robustness against inﬂation
misspeciﬁcation makes the exchange rate more sensitive to inﬂation shocks,
but less sensitive to output and exchange rate shocks.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proposition 4.3 (Worst-case exchange rate under output/exchange
rate misspeciﬁcation)
In the worst-case model, a larger preference for robustness against output or
exchange rate misspeciﬁcation makes the exchange rate more sensitive to output
and exchange rate shock, but less sensitive to inﬂation shocks.
23Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Proposition 4.4 (Monetary policy under inﬂation/exchange rate
misspeciﬁcation)
A larger preference for robustness against inﬂation or exchange rate
misspeciﬁcation makes monetary policy respond more aggressively to inﬂation
and exchange rate shocks, but less aggressively to output shocks.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Proposition 4.5 (Monetary policy under output misspeciﬁcation)
A larger preference for robustness against output misspeciﬁcation makes
monetary policy respond more aggressively to output shocks, but less
aggressively to inﬂation and exchange rate shocks.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
In general, we see that there is an ambiguous eﬀect of increased misspeciﬁcation
(an increased preference for robustness) on the optimal monetary policy rule.
Depending on the type of shock or the source of misspeciﬁcation, an increased
preference for robustness can make policy more or less aggressive in response
to shocks.
4.3 The approximating model
Finally, we analyze the eﬀects on the most likely development of the
macroeconomy when there is an increase in the central bank’s preference for
robustness. As there is no misspeciﬁcation in the approximating model, the
eﬀects of increased robustness come exclusively from the robust policy.
Proposition 4.6 (Approximating inﬂation and output)
In the approximating model, an increased preference for robustness against
inﬂation or exchange rate misspeciﬁcation makes inﬂation less sensitive and
output more sensitive to all shocks, but increased robustness against output
misspeciﬁcation has the opposite eﬀect.
Proof. The inﬂation coeﬃcients on the inﬂation and exchange rate
shocks are both positive, so increased robustness has opposite eﬀects on those
coeﬃcients relative to the coeﬃcients in the policy rule, see equations (3.58)
and (3.60). The inﬂation coeﬃcient on the output shock is negative, so the
eﬀects on this coeﬃcient are of the same sign as on the coeﬃcient in the policy
rule, see equation (3.59). The eﬀects on the output coeﬃcients will allways
be of the opposite sign relative to the inﬂation coeﬃcients, see equations
(3.61)—(3.63).
24Proposition 4.7 (Approximating exchange rate)
In the approximating model, increased robustness against inﬂation or exchange
rate misspeciﬁcation makes the exchange rate more sensitive to inﬂation shocks,
but less sensitive to output and exchange rate shocks. Increased robustness
against output misspeciﬁcation has the opposite eﬀect.
Proof. The eﬀects on the exchange rate coeﬃcients on the inﬂation and
output shocks will be of the same sign as on the inﬂation and output coeﬃcients
in the policy rule, see equations (3.64) and (3.65). The eﬀects on the coeﬃcients
on the exchange rate shock will be of the opposite sign relative to the exchange
rate coeﬃcient in the policy rule, see equation (3.66)
Thus, if the central bank fears misspeciﬁcation in the inﬂation and exchange
rate equations, it will respond more aggressively to inﬂation and exchange
rate shocks, but less to output shocks. This makes inﬂation respond less and
output more to all shocks. Essentially, the central bank acts as if it attached
a larger weight to stabilizing inﬂation relative to output. The exchange rate,
on the other hand, responds more to inﬂation shocks, but less to output and
exchange rate shocks.
If instead the central bank fears misspeciﬁcation in the output equation,
the eﬀects go in the opposite direction. The central bank responds more
aggressively to output shocks, but less to inﬂation and exchange rate shocks,
which makes inﬂation respond more and output less to all shocks, while
the exchange rate responds less to inﬂation shocks but more to output and
exchange rate shocks.
4.4 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the eﬀects of increased robustness on the reduced-form
coeﬃcients. The third column shows the sign of each coeﬃcient, and the next
three columns show the eﬀects of an increase the preference for robustness (so
ad e c r e a s ei nt h eθ’s) on the absolute values of the reduced-form coeﬃcients.
Thus, a positive sign implies that the variable in question is more sensitive to
that particular shock when robustness increases, and vice versa.
We see that robustness against exchange rate misspeciﬁcation
has qualitatively very similar eﬀects as robustness against inﬂation
misspeciﬁcation. The only exception regards the eﬀects on the exchange
rate in the worst-case model. On the other hand, robustness against
output misspeciﬁcation always has the opposite eﬀects on policy and the
approximating model relative to inﬂation and exchange rate misspeciﬁcation.
From Table 1 it is again clear that the eﬀects of robustness on monetary
policy are ambiguous: A robust policymaker may respond more or less
aggressively to shocks than a non-robust policymaker, depending on both the
shock and the source of misspeciﬁcation.
25Table 1: Eﬀects of increased robustness on reduced-form coeﬃcients
Equation Coeﬃcient on Sign Source of misspeciﬁcation
Inﬂation Output Exchange rate
(θπ)( θx)( θe)
Worst-case model
Inﬂation (πt) Inﬂation (aπ) ++ + +
Output (ax) − ++ +
Exchange rate (ae) ++ + +
Output (xt) Inﬂation (bπ) − ++ +
Output (bx) ++ + +
Exchange rate (be) − ++ +
Exchange rate (et) Inﬂation (cπ) − + −−
Output (cx) −− ++
Exchange rate (ce) + − ++
Policy rule
Interest rate (it) Inﬂation (dπ) ++ − +
Output (dx) + − + −
Exchange rate (de) ++ − +
Approximating model
Inﬂation (πt) Inﬂation (¯ aπ) + − + −
Output (¯ ax) −− + −
Exchange rate (¯ ae) + − + −
Output (xt) Inﬂation (¯ bπ) − + − +
Output (¯ bx) ++ − +
Exchange rate (¯ be) − + − +
Exchange rate (et) Inﬂation (¯ cπ) − + − +
Output (¯ cx) −− + −
Exchange rate (¯ ce) + − + −
Note: For each coeﬃcient in the reduced-form model, Column 3 shows the sign of the
coeﬃcient, and Columns 4—6 show the eﬀects of an increased central bank preference
for robustness on the absolute value of the coeﬃcient. Thus, +/− implies that incresed
robustness makes the variable in question more/less sensitive to that particular shock.
265 A numerical example
To obtain a feeling for the quantitative eﬀects of an increased preference for
robustness, this section presents a simple numerical example. Of course, as the
model is highly stylized, all quantitative results need to be interpreted with
care. Nevertheless, this example will illustrate the relative importance of the
diﬀerent types of misspeciﬁcation on the model coeﬃcients.
To parameterize the model, we take values for the structural parameters
from Galí and Monacelli (2004): ˆ σ = δ =1 , η =3 , θ =0 .75, β =0 .99, and
ω =0 .4. This implies that the coeﬃcients in the model (2.2)—(2.4) are given
by κ =0 .343, α =0 .0343, σ =1 .667,a n dγ =0 .4. Finally, we set the relative
weight on output stabilization in the central bank’s loss function to λ =0 .25,
and the shock variances Σj are all set to unity.12
We then investigate how an increased preference for robustness against one
source of misspeciﬁcation (ie, a decrease in each θj, keeping the other θ’s ﬁxed
at a large value) aﬀects the parameters in the central bank’s worst-case model,
the policy rule and the approximating model. The results are reported in
Figures 1—7. It is immediately clear that an increased preference for robustness
(moving from right to left in each panel) has diﬀerent quantitative eﬀects on the
coeﬃcients in the worst-case and approximating models as well as in the policy
rule. In general, there are large eﬀects of all sorts of misspeciﬁcation fears
on the coeﬃcient on inﬂation shocks in all equations, both in the worst-case
model, the approximating model and in the policy rule, while the eﬀects are
substantially smaller for most other coeﬃcients. This reﬂects the fact that
inﬂation shocks pose the most diﬃcult trade-oﬀ for the central bank, as there
are no direct eﬀects of monetary policy on inﬂation, only through the output
gap and the exchange rate.
We also note that for very small values of θx and θe,s o m ec o e ﬃ c i e n t s
reverse sign. For instance, when θx falls below 0.03 the central bank fears that
inﬂation shocks have a positive impact on the exchange rate (see Figure3b),
leading it to reduce the interest rate after positive inﬂation shocks (Figure
4b). In practical applications, such cases could possibly be excluded using
‘detection probabilities’ to determine the relevant preference for robustness.
However, as the present model is much too stylized to bring to the data, such
applications are beyond the scope of this paper.
12In the objective function derived as a second-order approximation to utility, Galí and
Monacelli (2004) show that λ =( 1− θ)(1 − βθ)(1 + η)/( θ),w h e r e  is the elasticity of
substitution across the diﬀerentiated domestic goods. Using their value of   =6 ,t h i s
implies that λ =0 .0572. We use a slightly larger (and possibly more realistic) value for λ.
However, the qualitative results are not sensitive to the value of λ.
276 Concluding remarks
Using a simple model of a small open economy we have analyzed how optimal
monetary policy and the behavior of the economy are aﬀected by the central
bank’s desire to be robust against model misspeciﬁcation. Our simple model
enables us to solve analytically for the optimal robust policy, as well as the
central bank’s worst-case model and the most likely approximating model.
Our framework also allows us to analyze cases when the policymaker is more
conﬁdent about some equations in the model than others. It thus restricts the
evil agent to introduce misspeciﬁcation where it will hurt the most, but forces
it to consider misspeciﬁcation in equations that are perceived to be particularly
prone to speciﬁcation errors.
Our analysis shows that an increase in the central bank’s preference for
robustness has ambiguous eﬀects on the optimal policy behavior, depending
not only on the shock to which the central bank responds, but also on what part
of the model the central bank perceives as most uncertain. Although our model
is highly stylized, we believe this ambiguity to carry over also to more elaborate
models. In numerical applications the eﬀects of increased misspeciﬁcation will
therefore depend crucially on the calibration of the parameters that determine
the central bank’s relative faith in the diﬀerent model equations.
In a companion paper (Leitemo and Söderström, 2004) we focus on the
optimal robust policy in the closed-economy version of our model. There, the
results are unambiguous: the robust policy always responds more aggressively
to shocks than the non-robust policy, conﬁrming the results of previous
research. As a consequence, inﬂation is less volatile and output is more volatile
under the robust policy. The present paper shows that the eﬀects of robustness
in the open economy are more complex. This is because the open economy
presents more complicated trade-oﬀs for the central bank, at least when we
allow for shocks to the exchange rate.
Key parameters in our approach are the diﬀerent preferences for robustness
relating to the diﬀerent equations in the model. We envision that
future research can use Bayesian techniques in distributing the budgets of
misspeciﬁcation among the model equations based on the probability that
each equation is a good representation of true economies. This would be a step
towards integrating Bayesian and Knightian uncertainty into a single unifying
analysis of model uncertainty.
28References
Ball, L. (1994) Credible disinﬂation with staggered price-setting.
American Economic Review, 84 (1), 282—289.
Brainard, W. (1967) Uncertainty and the eﬀectiveness of policy.
American Economic Review, 57 (2), 411—425.
Calvo, G.A. (1983) Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 12 (3), 383—398..
Christiano, L.J. — Eichenbaum, M. — Evans, C.L. (2005) Nominal rigidities
and the dynamic eﬀects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of
Political Economy, 113 (1), 1—45.
Clarida, R. — Galí, R. — Gertler, M. (1999a) The science of monetary
policy: A New Keynesian perspective. Journal of Economic Literature,
37 (4), 1661—1707.
Clarida, R. — Galí, R. — Gertler, M. (1999b) As i m p l ef r a m e w o r kf o r
international monetary policy analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics,
49 (5), 879—904.
Craine, R. (1979) Optimal monetary policy with uncertainty. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 1 (1), 59—83.
Estrella, A. — Fuhrer, J.C. (2002) Dynamic inconsistencies:
Counter-factual implications of a class of rational-expectations
models. American Economic Review, 92 (4), 1013—1028.
Galí, J. — Monacelli, T. (2004) Monetary policy and exchange rate
volatility in a small open economy. Manuscript, Universitat Pompeu
Fabra and IGIER, Università Bocconi. Forthcoming, Review of Economic
Studies.
Giannoni, M.P. (2002) Does model uncertainty justify caution? Robust
optimal monetary policy in a forward-looking model. Macroeconomic
Dynamics, 6 (1), 111—144..
Giannoni, M.P. — Woodford, M. (2003) Optimal interest-rate rules: I.
General theory. Working Paper No. 9419, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Giordani, P. — Söderlind, P. (2004) Solution of macromodels with
Hansen-Sargent robust policies: Some extensions. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 28 (12), 2367—2397.
Goodfriend, M. — King, R.G. (1997) The new neoclassical synthesis and
the role of monetary policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 231—283.
Hansen, L.P. — Sargent, T.J. (2001) Acknowledging misspeciﬁcation in
macroeconomic theory. Review of Economic Dynamics, 4 (3), 519—535.
29Hansen, L.P. — Sargent, T.J. (2004) M i s s p e c i ﬁ c a t i o ni nR e c u r s i v e
Macroeconomic Theory. Book manuscript, University of Chicago and New
York University.
King, R.G (2000) The new IS-LM model: Language, logic, and limits.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 86 (3), 45—103.
Leitemo, K. — Söderström, U. (2004) Robust monetary policy in
the New-Keynesian framework. Discussion Paper No. 4805, Centre for
Economic Policy Research.
Leitemo, K. — Söderström, U. (2005) Simple monetary policy rules and
exchange rate uncertainty. Journal of International Money and Finance,
24 (3), 481—507.
Mankiw, N.G. (2001) The inexorable and mysterious tradeoﬀ between
inﬂation and unemployment. Economic Journal, 111 (471), C45—C61.
Onatski, A. — Williams, N. (2003) Modeling model uncertainty. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 1 (5), 1087—1122.
Rotemberg, J.J. — Woodford, M. (1997) An optimization-based
econometric framework for the evaluation of monetary policy. In B.S.
Bernanke and J.J. Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomic Annual, The MIT
Press.
Söderström, U. (2002) Monetary policy with uncertain parameters.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104 (1), 125—145.
Svensson, L.E.O. (2000) Open-economy inﬂation targeting. Journal of
International Economics, 50 (1), 155—184.
Walsh, C.E. (1999) Monetary policy trade-oﬀs in the open economy.
Manuscript, University of California, Santa Cruz.
Walsh, C.E. (2003) Monetary Theory and Policy. The MIT Press, second
edition.
Walsh, C.E. (2004) Robust optimal instrument rules and robust
control: An equivalence result. Manuscript, University of California, Santa
Cruz. Forthcoming, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
30Appendix A
Model appendix
This Appendix brieﬂy derives our open-economy model from microfoundations.
For more details, see Galí and Monacelli (2004), Clarida et al (2002), or Walsh
(2003, Ch. 6.5), who provides a textbook treatment. We deviate from these
authors by introducing a time-varying premium on foreign exchange, in order
to analyze uncertainty about exchange rate determination.
A.1 Domestic households
Households in the home country consume a CES composite of domestic goods
(Cd
t ) and imported foreign goods (Cm













where ω is the share of foreign goods in consumption and δ is the elasticity
of substitution across domestic and foreign goods. Households obtain utility












where ˆ σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and η is the elasticity of
labor supply.
The household chooses paths of consumption, labor supply, and holdings
of one-period domestic bonds, which pay the nominal interest rate it and
foreign bonds, which pay the risk-adjusted interest rate exp(φt)i
f
t,w h e r eφt is
a time-varying premium on foreign bond holdings. Intertemporal optimization
then gives the log-linearized consumption Euler condition









where β is the household’s discount factor and πc
t is the consumer price inﬂation
rate, deﬁned as πc
t ≡ pc
t − pc
t−1, where the CPI is given by
p
c
t =( 1− ω)pt + ωp
m
t , (6.4)
where pt and pm
t are the price levels for domestic and imported goods.
Optimal allocation across domestic and foreign bond holdings gives the
uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
it = i
f
t + Et∆st+1 + φt, (6.5)
where st is the nominal exchange rate, and φt is the premium on foreign
exchange. The optimal labor-leisure choice implies that
ηnt +ˆ σct = wt − p
c
t. (6.6)






t = −δ [pt − p
m
t ]. (6.7)
We deﬁne the real exchange rate in terms of the domestic price level as
et = st + p
f
t − pt, (6.8)
which, assuming that the law of one price holds, is equal to the terms of trade
pm
t − pt. Then we can express the UIP condition (6.5) in real terms as




t+1 + Et∆et+1 + φt. (6.9)
We can then also write the CPI in (6.4) as
p
c
t = pt + ωet, (6.10)
the CPI inﬂation rate as
π
c
t = πt + ω∆et, (6.11)
and the labor supply condition in (6.6) as
ηnt +ˆ σct = wt − pt − ωet. (6.12)
Log-linearizing the consumption index (6.1), we get









t − ωδet. (6.14)
A.2 Domestic ﬁrms
Domestic ﬁrms act under monopolistic competition and produce a
diﬀerentiated good using only labor inputs according to the production
function
Yt = exp(at)Nt, (6.15)
where at is a productivity disturbance.
Firms face a constant elasticity demand curve for its output, and also
face sticky prices, following Calvo (1983), so in each period there is a ﬁxed
probability 1 − θ that the ﬁrm will be able to change its price. When prices
can be adjusted, ﬁrms maximize the expected discounted value of proﬁts. This
implies that inﬂation in the domestic sector follows the New-Keynesian Phillips
curve
πt = βEtπt+1 +ˆ κvt, (6.16)
32where ˆ κ ≡ (1 − θ)(1 − βθ)/θ and vt is real marginal cost, given by
vt = wt − pt − at, (6.17)
and where wt − pt is the real product wage, which is deﬂated by the domestic
price level.
A.3 The foreign country





t + δet, (6.18)
where y
f

















Equilibrium requires that production equal consumption, so the production of
domestic goods satisﬁes





=( 1 − ω)ct +( 2− ω)ωδet + ωy
f
t , (6.20)
using (6.14) and (6.18), and combining with the consumption Euler equation
(6.3) we obtain











Denoting by ¯ z the ﬂexible-price level of the variable z, the ﬂexible-price
equilibrium is characterized by the goods market equilibrium condition
¯ yt =¯ ct, (6.22)
the labor market equilibrium condition
at =( ˆ σ + η)¯ yt − ηat + ω¯ et, (6.23)
where we have combined equations (6.12), (6.17), the log-linearized production
function yt = at+nt, and (6.22). Assuming that the foreign exchange premium
is zero in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, the real UIP condition (6.9), the Euler
equation (6.21), and the foreign Euler equation (6.19) imply that the real
interest rate satisﬁes






















33Assuming that all disturbances are white noise, all expectations of future
variables are zero, so (6.24) gives
¯ et =Ψ
 








1 − ω +( 2− ω)ωδˆ σ
, (6.26)
and the labor-market equilibrium condition (6.23) then implies that
¯ yt =
1
ˆ σ + η + ωΨ
 





A.5 The ﬁnal steps
Combining the expression for marginal cost in (6.17), the labor supply
condition (6.12), and using ct = yt = at + nt we can express real marginal
cost as
vt = ηnt +ˆ σct + ωet − at
=( ˆ σ + η)yt − ηat + ωet − at, (6.28)
and in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, the marginal product of labor satisﬁes
at =( ˆ σ + η)¯ yt − ηat + ω¯ et, (6.29)
so
vt =( ˆ σ + η)xt + ω[et − ¯ et], (6.30)
where xt is the output gap, deﬁned as
xt ≡ yt − ¯ yt, (6.31)














This implies that we can write the Phillips curve (6.16) as
πt = βEtπt+1 +ˆ κ(ˆ σ + η)xt +ˆ κωet − ˆ κω¯ et, (6.32)
and the Euler equation (6.21) can be written as








− (2 − ω)ωδEt∆et+1






[it − Etπt+1] −
 





+ Et∆¯ yt+1 − ωEt∆y
f
t+1. (6.33)
34Finally, setting all foreign variables to zero, equations (6.32), (6.33) and (6.9)
give a complete description of the small open economy:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + αet +Σ πε
π
t , (6.34)
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
[it − Etπt+1] − γ [Etet+1 − et]+Σ xε
x
t, (6.35)























(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)(1 + η)ωΨ







t [¯ yt+1 − ¯ yt]
=
1+η
(ˆ σ + η + ωΨ)Σx
















for j = π,x,e, and we note that limθj→∞ Θ
−1
j =0 .
B.1 The worst-case model
To ﬁnd the reduced from for inﬂation and the exchange rate in the worst-case
model, ﬁrst write equations (3.29) and (3.31) as
πt = a1Etπt+1 + a2et + a3ε
π
t , (6.45)

















































where the aj,c j coeﬃcients remain to be determined.


































36Thus, the coeﬃcients satisfy
aπ = a2cπ + a3, (6.58)
ax = a2cx, (6.59)
ae = a2ce, (6.60)
cπ = c2aπ, (6.61)
cx = c2ax + c3, (6.62)
ce = c2ae + c4, (6.63)
and the solution of this system is







































































E ≡ (1 − a2c2)(1 + σγ)C
=( 1 + σγ)C + αD > 0. (6.76)
Note that we evaluate the signs of all coeﬃcients for an inﬁnitesimal preference
for robustness, so θj →∞ .





























B.2 The policy rule
Using the interest rate equation (3.26), the reduced form for the interest rate
is










































dx = σ[Bax + γcx +Σ x]
= σ
 




















38w h e r ew en o t et h a t
E − ασB − σγC
=( 1 + σγ)C + αD − ασB − σγC
= C + α(D − σB)




e > 0, (6.86)
using (3.32) and (3.41).
B.3 The approximating model
To ﬁnd the solution for the approximating model, use the policy rule
(6.82)—(6.85) in the equations for inﬂation, output and the exchange rate,












−1it + γet +Σ xε
x
t, (6.89)


























¯ cπ = −dπ < 0, (6.94)
¯ cx = −dx < 0, (6.95)
¯ ce =Σ e − de
=Σ e − [αB + γC]
σΣe
E




¯ bπ = γ¯ cπ − σ
−1dπ









¯ bx =Σ x + γ¯ cx − σ
−1dx
=Σ x − σ(γ + σ

























39¯ be = γ¯ ce − σ
−1de

































¯ aπ =Σ π + κ¯ bπ + α¯ cπ
=Σ π −
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α + κ(γ + σ
−1)
 





κ[(1 + σγ)C + αD] −
 














































































40¯ ae = κ¯ be + α¯ ce
=( α + κγ)Σe −
 









































































The eﬀects of increased robustness






































































C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1












and the output coeﬃcients are given by bj = −Aaj for all j.T h u s , a l l
coeﬃcients depend negatively (in absolute value) on E, and the eﬀects of
increased robustness (a decrease in any θj) on the absolute value of all
coeﬃcients have the opposite sign relative to the eﬀects on the coeﬃcient
E, which are all negative (see above). Therefore, the inﬂation and output
coeﬃcients all increase in absolute value when misspeciﬁcation in any equation
increases (any θj falls). 
42C.2 Proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3












ae > 0. (6.115)
Proof of Proposition 4.2
The eﬀects of increased robustness against inﬂation misspeciﬁcation on the








































































so all derivatives have the opposite sign to those of cx. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3
The eﬀects of increased robustness against output and exchange rate
misspeciﬁcation on the inﬂation and output coeﬃcients in the exchange rate

































































































































































and again all derivatives of ce have the opposite sign to those of cx. 
C.3 Proofs of Propositions 4.4 and 4.5


















E − ασB − σγC
= C + α(D − σB)




e > 0. (6.126)
Proof of Proposition 4.4
The eﬀects on the policy rule coeﬃcients of increased robustness against

























































































































45Proof of Proposition 4.5
The eﬀects on the policy rule coeﬃcients of increased robustness against output






























































































< 0.  (6.131)
46Figure 1: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness on the coeﬃcients
in the worst-case model for inﬂation

































(c) Exchange rate misspecification
θ
e
47Figure 2: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness on the coeﬃcients
in the worst-case model for output


































(c) Exchange rate misspecification
θ
e
48Figure 3: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness on the coeﬃcients
in the worst-case model for the exchange rate
































(c) Exchange rate misspecification
θ
e
49Figure 4: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness of the coeﬃcients
in the policy rule


































(c) Exchange rate misspecification
θ
e
50Figure 5: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness on the coeﬃcients
in the approximating model for inﬂation


































(c) Exchange rate misspecification
θ
e
51Figure 6: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness on the coeﬃcients
in the approximating model for output






























(c) Exchange rate misspecification
θ
e
52Figure 7: Eﬀects of an increased preference for robustness on the coeﬃcients
in the approximating model for the exchange rate
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